This paper investigates the role of labor markets heterogeneity in a monetary union and especially what are the welfare gains/costs of labor market reforms for each member of the area. To this end, we develop a medium-scale two-country model representing a currency union characterized by price and wage stickiness, real rigidities and labor market frictions. We make various scenarios of labor market reform and seek to determine the direction in which a country has an incentive to direct it from a welfare perspective. Several results emerge. First, the choice of the instruments to direct a reform (aiming at reducing the home unemployment rate)
Introduction
It is widely accepted that the euro area economy as a whole is characterized by real and nominal rigidities in most markets, disabling the labor market to function e¤ectively. Indeed, average unemployment is persistently high (between 8% and 9% since 1999), average participation rate is low (around 69% since 1999) and real wages seem to be rather in ‡exible. The bad performance of the euro area labor market in ‡uences the well being of both the economy and society. A perfect ‡exibility of the labor market would imply that following any change in the economic environment, the labor force would be immediately redeployed to its most e¢ cient use, with unemployment remaining at its structural level. However, there are many costs and impediments to such instantaneous adjustment, such as institutional features. It means that it should take more time for relative prices and quantities to fully re ‡ect the new economic environment in the euro area than in other large areas.
Such frictions cannot be neglected and the understanding of labor market properties is of considerable importance for the conduct of monetary policy. Although recent fully- ‡edged models, like Christiano et al. (2005) and Wouters (2003, 2005) , are successful at explaining a number of phenomena, their lack of implications about the labor market have lead researchers to depart from the competitive labor market hypothesis. For example, following the seminal contributions by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) , some papers have attempted to incorporate labor market search and matching frictions in such New-Keynesian models (Moyen and Sahuc, 2005 , Trigari, 2005 , and Walsh, 2005 . 1 They show that introducing these features improves the empirical performance of the closed-economy sticky-price model in several directions: (i) the existence of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium allows to reproduce the labor market stylized facts characterized by the Beveridge and Phillips curves; (ii) labor market frictions act as a necessary complement to nominal rigidities; (iii) monetary policy shocks can explain important features of labor market ‡uctuations.
However, in a single currency union, an additional di¢ culty due to the heterogeneity among the members appears. First, with a common currency, a low level of labor market ‡exibility is more costly within the area since neither independent monetary policy nor the exchange rate could be adjustment mechanisms in the face of asymmetric or symmetric economic shocks. For example, adjustment to a country-speci…c or asymmetric shock may require a change in the real exchange rate and relative wages between countries to keep the adverse impact on unemployment and output to a minimum. Outside a currency union, this can be achieved either through an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate or an adjustment of factor and goods prices complemented by an appropriate monetary policy. Without the nominal exchange rate within a single currency, this would imply a less ‡exible economy. Second, as the monetary authorities take their decisions on the basis of aggregate developments, national idiosyncrasies are left to the care of national governments. Although the monetary authorities are interested on the aggregate variables, there are clearly disparities among the members. For example, in 2006, the unemployment rate of the Netherlands or Ireland is low (resp. 3.9% and 4.4%) and rather high in France or Greece (resp. 9.5% and 8.9%). What does it imply? The former group of countries spends a shorter period than the later group out of equilibrium or, in terms of the output gap, actual output remains closer to trend or potential. It would appear, therefore, that the more ‡exible are the labor markets the better.
Then, the key issue is not labor market ‡exibility per se since the common monetary policy can react to average responses in the union, but rather asymmetries across member countries. A body of evidence has discussed the e¤ects of having disparities between the labor market institutions of di¤erent regions in a monetary union (Guichard and La¤argue, 2000 , Hughes Hallett and Viegi, 2003, or Dellas and Tavlas, 2005) . They show that a shock that initially has a symmetric e¤ect across the monetary union will evolve into an asymmetric shock if the labor market of one region is more ‡exible than another and then it adjusts more rapidly. Nevertheless, Compolmi and Faia (2007) also show that a calibrated model of a monetary union with country-speci…c labor market institutions is able to replicate the data evidence.
To assess the need for structural labor market reforms, as stressed recurrently by the European Central Bank and recommended by the Lisbon Strategy (also known as the Lisbon Agenda) 2 , it is necessary to investigate how labor markets will perform and interact into a monetary union.
The issue is not only to know how the overall performance of the monetary union is a¤ected by a modi…cation of the frictions on the labor market, but also how the country-speci…c environment is modi…ed and what are the implications in terms of welfare. 3 The purpose of this paper is to study the role of labor markets heterogeneity in a monetary union and especially to know what are the welfare gains/costs of labor market reforms for each members of the area. We investigate which modi…cation on the labor market structure (i.e. the labor market parameters) could provide the weaker loss in order to achieve a (low) unemployment rate target.
Therefore, we make various scenarios and elaborate which scenarios are preferable from a welfare perspective. To do so, we develop a model of a two-country monetary union which resorts to the "New Open Economy Macroeconomics"literature. By incorporating signi…cant frictions in the form of nominal and real rigidities, such structural models have been shown to provide a su¢ ciently rich dynamics to …t the actual data fairly well. Cross-country di¤erences in the structural parameters and home bias in preferences are incorporated in the model. Finally, the matching model is chosen as it may provide a simple and elegant representation of European labor market characteristics in capturing the salient features of the theory of involuntary unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. In a …rst section, we describe the medium-scale monetary union model. A second section is devoted to the model's calibration. A third section analysis the welfare implications of heterogeneous labour markets in the monetary union. A last section o¤ers some concluding remarks.
A model of a currency union
The world is composed of two countries, Home and Foreign (also denoted by H and F hereafter). The total population is ordered on a continuum of measure one. The population of country H belongs to [0; n), while the foreign population belongs to [n; 1]. Therefore, n is the relative measure of the home country size into the union. An agent in the home country is indexed by H 2 [0; n), while a foreign agent is indexed by F 2 [n; 1]. Variables in the home country are denoted X t while foreign variables are denoted X t . The home economy produces a continuum of di¤erentiated goods indexed by h 2 [0; n). Foreign goods (or, equivalently, goods produced in the rest of the area) are indexed by f 2 [n; 1].
The two countries are part of a currency union so that monetary policy is chosen for the whole area. 4 Financial markets are assumed to be complete both at the national and international level.
The labor market speci…cation is based on the economics of search. Wages and hours worked are set by Nash-bargaining between households and wholesalers. In addition, we introduce wage rigidity by assuming that the inertia of wages is due to a social norm (Hall, 2005) . Production of …nal goods takes place in two stages. Perfectly competitive wholesalers manage the production of the same homogeneous input good and make hiring decisions. Monopolistic retailers buy the input good to produce di¤erentiated …nal goods sold by the households and set prices to the discrete time version of Calvo's (1983) model. Finally, households are assumed to have a taste bias towards home-produced goods. Since preferences di¤er across countries, the price of consumption bundles will di¤er when expressed in a common currency. The real exchange rate thus deviates from purchasing power parity (PPP).
This model extends Wouters (2003, 2005) on the labor market and openess features.
However, the core of the model is identical such that it guarantees an acceptable goodness-of-…t. In addition, since the two countries are perfectly symmetric in the currency union, we only concentrate on the description of the home country side.
Households
The home economy is populated by a large number of in…nitively-living identical households, consuming Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of domestic and imported goods. A home household H owns a …rm producing goods h and receives dividends from it. We assume that households in a given country have the same preferences and endowments, de…ned over a composite consumption good (C t ), the employment's rate (N t ) and hours worked (H t ). Although there may be idiosyncratic shocks among households, we assume that they have access to complete markets for state-contingent claims, so that there is no heterogeneity among agents in a given country. Consequently, all households in the same country behave in the same manner and then we consider the optimization problem of a representative household. The representative household in country H maximizes the following expected sequence of present and future utility ‡ows given by
subject to a series of real period budget constraints
5 The perfect insurance system makes the representative household a weighted average of employed and unemployed households, where the weight is the employment rate. That is why the employment rate enters the utility function and the budget constraint. By simpli…cation we suppose that there is no disutility to search a job.
where E t denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t, is the intertemporal discount factor, with 0 < < 1, > 0 is a scale parameter, c is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, and h is the elasticity of labor disutility with respect to hours worked. Preferences display external habit formation where the habit stock is supposed to equal the level of aggregate consumption in the previous period (C t = C t 1 ), and b represents the habit persistence parameter, measuring the e¤ect of past consumption on current utility (0 b < 1).
In addition, W t is the hourly real wage, is the unemployment bene…ts. Let P t denote consumption price index (CPI), R t is the nominal interest rate, T t is the real lump sum tax and t is the sum of the dividends derived from retailers ( r t ) and wholesalers ( w t ). Finally, we assume complete markets for state-contingent claims. Consequently, households can transfer wealth to the next period by holding B t+1 unit of the one-period nominal bond denominated in the domestic currency.
The maximization problem of the home household consists in maximizing equation (1) subject to constraint (2) , yielding the optimal pro…le of consumption, holdings of domestic bond. The …rst-order conditions imply
where U C;t denotes the derivative of utility U with respect to variable C at the period t. Equation consumption is equal to the inverse of the real interest rate.
Composite consumption index
The aggregate consumption index for home households and the corresponding consumption index for foreign households are de…ned by
where ! and ! denote the share of home goods in the consumption of home and foreign households respectively. C H;t (resp. C F ;t ) is the sub-index of consumption of imperfectly substitutable, home 6 We abstract here from the optimal intra-temporal allocations between domestic and foreign goods.
(resp. foreign) goods, which is in turn given by the following CES aggregators
where C t (h) (resp. C t (f )) is consumption of the generic good h (resp. f ) produced in country H (resp. F). Parameter " p denotes the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a given country. The corresponding consumption price indexes are given by
Here, P H;t (resp. P F ;t ) is the price sub-index for home-(resp. foreign-) produced goods expressed in the home currency, de…ned as
where P H;t (h) (resp. P F ;t (f )) is the price of a generic good h (resp. f ) produced in country H (resp.
F).
We also assume that prices are set in the producer's currency and that the law of one price holds.
We then have P H;t (h) = P H;t (h) S t and P F ;t (f ) = P F ;t (f ) S t , where S t is the nominal exchange rate expressed as units of domestic currency needed for one unit of foreign currency. Under the currency union assumption the nominal exchange rate is equal to one (S t = 1). Since we assume the same elasticity of substitution among goods in a given country, we also have P H;t = P H;t and P F ;t = P F ;t . Yet, from the de…nition of the CPI, we obtain that
Therefore, if we assume that there exists a home bias in preferences (! 6 = ! ), PPP does not necessarily hold, i.e. P t 6 = P t . We expect ! > ! , so that home households put a higher weight on home goods than foreign households.
International risk sharing
Under the assumption of complete markets, domestic and foreign households trade in state-contingent claims denominated in the home currency. This implies the following perfect risk-sharing condition
where the real exchange rate, de…ned as Q t S t P t =P t , is proportional to the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption between the two countries. 7 Since the real exchange rate deviates from PPP because of home bias in preferences, we also have
where T t is the home terms of trade, i.e. the relative price between foreign and home bundles of goods as perceived by the home resident. It is de…ned as
From equalities (7), we easily deduce that
where t and t are the CPI in ‡ation rate in the home and the foreign country, respectively. In addition, H;t and F ;t are domestic in ‡ation rate in the home and the foreign country, respectively, de…ned as the in ‡ation of the index of domestic goods prices. Using equations (10), (3), (8) and (9), we obtain
Equation (11) provides a rather elegant way to escape the exchange rate non-stationarity and model indeterminacy issues. Note that, when there is no home bias in preferences (! = ! ), the perfect risk sharing assumption does not allow to determine the terms of trade anymore.
Labor market matching of the home country
At the macroeconomic level, the law of motion of aggregate employment (N t ) is
is a constant that depicts initial condition. 8 The foreign terms of trade are simply given by T t = P H;t =P F;t = 1=Tt; because the law of one price holds.
where s 2 (0; 1) denotes the job separation rate. Therefore, proportion s of all …lled jobs disappears at each instant, and M t is the mass of recruiting at period t. 9 Thus, matching which take place at the period t are only productive at the following period.
The matching function is a very convenient hypothetical concept whose basic idea is that the recruiting e¤ort of employers and the search e¤ort of workers serve as inputs in a market matching function that generates new hires. 10 The job vacancies (V t ) and unemployed workers (U t ) are randomly matched with each other. The aggregate ‡ow of job matches are deterministic and given by the following matching technology
where # 2 (0; 1) denotes the unemployment elasticity to the matching function andm > 0 is a scale parameter. The matching technology exhibits constant return to scale. We choose a Cobb-Douglas form for its simplicity. The labor force being normalized to one, the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of any given period is U t = 1 N t .
The job vacancies and unemployed workers that are matched together in period t are randomly selected from the sets V t and U t . Hence, the stochastic process governing the state of vacant jobs during an interval of time is Poisson with rate
In other words, t can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability of a vacancy being …lled. Also, the average steady-state duration of a job vacancy is 1= .
Similarly, the instantaneous probability that an unemployed worker …nds a vacant position is given by
which means that the average steady-state duration of unemployment is 1= %. Recall that the labor market speci…cation is identical in the foreign country.
The production sector in the domestic and the foreign country
Production of …nal goods in each country takes place in two stages. First, perfectly competitive wholesalers manage the production of the same homogenous input good and make investment and 9 To simplify the analysis, we ignore any endogenous separation. Hall (2005) has argued that the separation rate varies little over the business cycle, although part of the literature disputes this position.
1 0 Firms have jobs that are …lled or vacant and workers have a job or are unemployed but only the vacant jobs are o¤ered and unemployed people are engaged in search. This assumption implies that the two activities of production of goods and trade in labour market are strictly separate activities.
hiring decisions. Second, there is a continuum of in…nitely living and monopolistic retailers indexed by h on the interval [0; n) for the home country and by f on the interval [n; 1] for the foreign country.
They buy the input good to produce di¤erentiated goods which are bundled into homogeneous home and foreign goods by a constant returns to scale of the Dixit-Stiglitz form
and
In addition, they set prices according to the discrete time version of Calvo's (1983) model. Since, the maximization problems which characterize the production sector are symmetric across the two economies, we present only the ones for the home region.
Wholesalers
We consider a representative …rm in each country which acts on a perfect competition market and makes investment and hiring decisions. Each period, this …rm uses physical capital (K t ) and labor (total hours, N t H t ) as inputs in order to produce a homogeneous wholesale good (Y w t ) which cannot be consumed and will be sold to retailers at relative price M C t = P w t =P t to produce a di¤erentiated …nal good. The production technology is given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of value added with respect to capital, z t is the capital utilization rate. For computational convenience, we assume constant return to scale.
The modelling of investment can be linked to Tobin's Q-model, which couples investment decisions to forward-looking stock market valuations of the …rm. This model can be derived from the theory if it is assumed that investment is subject to adjustment costs, which are a convex function of the rate of change of the …rm's capital stock. The …rm's stock of physical capital evolves according to
where I t denotes time t purchases of investment goods and (z t ) a positive, increasing and convex function of the utilization rate de…ned by
that re ‡ects the fact that a higher utilization rate raises the depreciation rate of capital (with d > 1).
> 0 is a scale parameter. The functional form chosen here for the adjustment costs is given by
with $ > 0.
The representative …rm chooses sequences of vacancies, investment, and utilization rate in order to maximize the expected sum of discounted pro…ts, taking as given a per vacancy cost ( ) in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
subject to the following constraints
is the discount factor between time t and t + j.
The …rst-order conditions of this program are given by
Wage and hours determination
As previously, we present only the labor decisions for the home country since sectors are symmetric across the two economies. In each country, wage and hours worked are determined by the generalized Nash-bargaining solution. Indeed, the matching between an unemployed person and a …rm who coordinate each other gives rise to a surplus which must be shared between the meeting pair. This sharing takes place at the match level through a bilateral and decentralized wage/hours negotiation.
Knowing that there are a representative household and a representative …rm, we are located directly at the symmetric equilibrium solution of the model.
Formally, the surplus generated by a successful match between an unemployed worker and a vacant job is the marginal value of employment. One can show that hourly real wage is given by
where 2 [0; 1] is the relative bargaining power of households and V = U measures the tightness of the labor market.
In addition, in order to avoid a too large procyclicity of wages, we introduce wage rigidities into the model in the form of a backward looking social norm (Hall, 2005) . 12 Precisely, we assume that the individual real wage is a weighted average of the one obtained thought the Nash-bargaining process and a wage norm which is set independently of idiosyncratic conditions. Consequently, the real wage paid in job is de…ned by
whereW is the wage norm, w 2 [0; 1] is the adjustment rate. Following Hall (2005), we adopt the adaptive wage speci…cation such thatW = W t 1 .
Finally, hours worked are determined by maximizing the joint surplus and are given by 13 (
Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by h on the interval [0; n).
Each of them is in…nitively lived and produces a di¤erentiated …nal good Y t (h) with a technology that transforms one unit of wholesale goods into one unit of retail goods, so that Y t (h) = Y w t (h). Firms on the retail sector purchase output from wholesale producers at the price M C t (which becomes the …rm's real marginal cost) and directly sell to households. 14 Retailers price setting decision is modelled through the Calvo's (1983) staggering mechanism. In 1 2 In the standard matching frictions model, real wages are too procyclical since they are directly driven by the dynamics of output. This implies a too less volatility of employment. 1 3 Rather than assuming that hours worked and real wages are determined simultaneously, we could have assumed that …rms choose hours worked, by taking the bargained real wage as given. This "right to manage" assumption (see Trigari, 2006 ) introduces a additional channel from the real wages to the real marginal cost and in ‡ation. 1 4 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the government and the wholesaler have the same optimal intratemporal allocations for each di¤erentiated goods as the household. addition to the baseline mechanism, we allow for the possibility that …rms that do not optimally set their prices may nonetheless adjust it to keep up with the previous period increase in the general price level. In each period, a …rm faces a constant probability, 1 p , of being able to re-optimize its price and chooses the new price P ? H;t (h) that maximizes the expected discounted sum of pro…ts
subject to the sequence of demand equations
with
where H is the domestic trend in ‡ation, the coe¢ cient p 2 [0; 1] indicates the degree of indexation to past in ‡ation during the periods in which …rm is not allowed to re-optimize. Finally, H t;t+j is a correcting term that accounts for the fact that, if …rm h does not re-optimize its price, it updates it according to the rule
Consequently, the …rst-order condition associated to the pro…t maximization implies that …rms set their price equal to the discounted stream of expected future real marginal costs
where p ? H;t (h) is the relative price of domestic goods and p " p = (" p 1) is the optimal markup in a ‡exible-price economy. In order to eliminate monopoly distortions, we assume that producers of intermediate goods are subsidized at rate tax such that (1 + tax) = p . As there are no …rm-speci…c shocks in this economy, all …rms that are allowed to re-optimize their price at date t select the same optimal price p ? H;t (h) = p ? H;t , 8h. Staggered price setting under partial indexation implies the following expression for the evolution of the domestic price index
The price setting problem solved by …rms in the foreign country is similar and leads to an optimal rule analogous to equation (31).
Market clearing conditions
Domestic and foreign outputs may be either transformed into a single type of consumption good, invested, consumed by the government, used up in vacancy posting costs or capital adjustment cost.
The allocation of demand across each of the goods produced within a given country for consumers H; F are then given by
where X t = fC t ; I t g and X t = fC t ; I t g :
The aggregator (5) implies that home and foreign demands for composite home and foreign are given by
Then, aggregate outputs in home and foreign goods are
Fiscal and monetary policy
We close the model by specifying the governments and monetary authorities behaviors. Governments spending (G t and G t ) are exogenous. Governments generate revenue from lump sum taxation and bonds creation and they pay unemployment bene…ts. Since we do not consider distortions taxes, the two governments face the following budget constraints
In addition, we assume that the common monetary authorities follow a standard Taylor rule of the form
where~ t = n t + (1 n) t denotes the union-wide in ‡ation (i.e. the weighted deviations of home and foreign CPI in ‡ations from their steady-state values, normalized to one)
) is the union's output gap (i.e. the weighted deviations of home and foreign outputs to their natural level, de…ned as the level of output that occurred when prices are ‡exible).
Model Calibration
The model is calibrated for the euro area at a quarterly frequency. The parameter values are based on some key stylized facts and some consistent …ndings in the literature. We assume that the monetary union consists of two countries which only di¤er in their labor market characteristics. Therefore, we calibrate the home and foreign labor market parameters with respect to di¤erent speci…cations, based on empirical statistics. In doing so, we seek to highlight whether heterogeneity among labor markets in a monetary union is costly when one of the euro area members is aimed at reducing its unemployment rate.
Non country-speci…c parameters
In order to investigate the e¤ects of labour market heterogeneity, we assume equal size between the two countries (n = n = 0:5) and all parameters -except those linked to the labor market -are calibrated in a symmetric way, replicating the euro area as a whole.
Preferences. We set the discount factor = 0:99, which gives an annual steady state real interest rate equal to 4%. We assign values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( c = 0:8), the elasticity of labor disutility ( h = 0:45), and the consumption habit parameter (b = 0:7) similar to those estimated by Sahuc and Smets (2008) . The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods " p is set equal to 6, corresponding to a markup p = 1:2, as usual in the literature (Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007) . Finally, the home bias parameter !, representing the share of home goods on total consumption is set to 0.8 (so ! = 0:2).
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Production. The share of government spending in the GDP is equal to 21% and the share of consumption in GDP is about 53%. The rate of capital depreciation ( ) is set to 2.5%. The capital share parameter ( ) is set to 0:35. The capital adjustment cost parameter $ is set to 10.
The degree of price rigidity p is set equal to 0.7 implying an average duration of price contracts of less than one year (Dhyne et al., 2006) . In addition, the price indexation parameter p is set equal to 0.5, a conventional value in the euro area DSGE literature. 
Country-speci…c parameters
There is a great heterogeneity among the euro area countries concerning the properties of the labor market. Indeed, we can consider three groups of countries with respect to their level of the unemploy- 1 5 This value is usual in the literature and sensitivity exercises are made below. ment rate ( Consequently, we calibrate the home and foreign labor market parameters in our model so as to reproduce this heterogeneity observed in the euro area. Precisely, we select one country in each group mentioned above (Netherlands, Italy and France) and we examine di¤erent combinations of the labour market properties of such countries. As we will see below, each of these countries well depicts a speci…c degree of frictions in the euro area labor market. In addition, this strategy is aimed at calibrating our theoretical labor market so as to recreate, as precisely as possible, the di¤erences inside the euro area labor market.
To this end, we consider three speci…cations for the monetary union. In the …rst speci…cation (S0), we assume that the monetary union consists of two identical countries (H and F) with labor market properties like those of France. Therefore, the two labor markets in the monetary union are symmetric and relatively rigid. Indeed, although the unemployment rate is about 10:5%, the unemployment and vacancy durations are not strongly extended (about less than 6 months and 3 months, respectively). 17 In a second speci…cation (S1), we assume that the currency union consists of two countries having similar unemployment rate (about 10:5%), but di¤ering on the other labor market characteristics. This would correspond to a pattern with France (H) and Italy (F), the latter having an extender unemployment duration than the former (more than one year). It is also interesting to observe that France and Italy have the same unemployment rate in 1999 but the rate of Italy decreases until 2006 whereas the rate of France stays at a high level (although volatile during the period). In the last speci…cation (S2), the monetary union consists of two countries di¤ering strongly in their labor market characteristics. Precisely, the …rst country representing by France (H) is characterized by a quite rigid labor market compared with the second country, representing by the Netherlands (F). Indeed, in the foreign country, the unemployment rate is about 3:2% in 1999, the unemployment duration is about less than 6 months and the vacancy duration is about 6 months. Now, we introduce the calibration of all the labor market parameters according to each speci…c-ation (cf. Table 3 ).
Labor market aggregates. We assume that in each country, households spend about one third of their time to work ( H = H = 0:30). In addition, the steady state value of the unemployment rate depends on the speci…cation. In S0 and S1, we assume that the home and foreign unemployment rates are around 10:5% ( N = N ' 0:895). In S2, we assume that the foreign country has a more ‡exible labor market so that its unemployment rate is about 3:2% ( N = 0:968; N = 0:895).
parameters by exploiting these statistics on the period 1999-2000. The choice of the period results from the availability of all the data that we need. In addition, focusing on this period is interesting for our analysis since the unemployment rates in France and Italy were very similar in 1999 (Table 1) , whereas some of their labor market properties (i.e. unemployment duration and unemployment bene…ts) di¤er signi…cantly. Note: S0: The home and foreign labor markets are relatively rigid. S1: The home labor market is relatively rigid and the foreign one is more rigid. S2: The home labor market is relatively rigid and the foreign one is more ‡exible.
Durations. The unemployment and vacancy durations refer to trading externalities meaning that they indicate the di¢ culty of …nding a worker (or a job). Therefore, the steady-state values of probabilities t and % t can easily be viewed as indicators of the degrees of friction in the labor market. Consequently, we vary these degrees in the two countries according to the speci…cation. In S0, we assume that the monetary union consists of two identical countries (France) with an average unemployment duration of 6 months ( % = % = 0:50) and an average vacancy duration of about 3 months ( = = 0:95). 18 This corresponds to an intermediate calibration between a purely rigid labor market and a purely ‡exible one. In S1, we assume that the home country (France) corresponds to a relatively rigid labor market as previously ( % = 0:50 and = 0:95) whereas the foreign country (Italy) features a more rigid labor market. Indeed, its unemployment duration is of 12 months and its vacancy duration is about 3 months ( % = 0:25 and = 0:95). Finally, the monetary union in S2 consists of a relatively rigid home labor market ( % = 0:50 and = 0:95) and a ‡exible foreign labor market (Netherlands). Therefore, the foreign unemployment duration is about 3 months and the vacancy duration is about 6 months ( % = 0:95 and = 0:50).
Destruction rate. The job destruction rate s is deduced from the previous calibrated parameters for each speci…cation. 19 The probability that a worker moves from employment to unemployment is about 5:87% for the two countries in S0. It is about 5:87% (resp. 5:87%) for the home country and 3:06% (resp. 3:14%) for the foreign country in S1 (resp. S2).
Bargaining strength. The relative bargaining power of households is also determined by the model's steady state and it depends on the speci…cation. In S0, we obtain that = = 0:58. This value is consistent with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) . In S1, this parameter is set to = 0:58 and = 0:61 in the home and the foreign country, respectively. Finally, in S2, we obtain = 0:58 and = 0:30. The lower household's bargaining power in the foreign country results from its high labor market tightness. In addition, we set = # and = # .
Costs and bene…ts. The unemployment bene…ts are calibrated in each speci…cation according to some empirical statistics. Precisely, the net replacement rate (in percentage of net earnings in work) is about 75% in France, 54% in Italy and 74% in the Netherlands. 20 In addition, aggregate expenditures on search activity ( V = Y ) are …xed at 2:5% in each speci…cation for each country.
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Wage rigidity. The degree of wage inertia w is set to 0:6, as proposed by Faia (2008) in each speci…cation for each country. We will proceed to sensitivity exercises with respect to the calibration of this parameter.
The welfare consequences of heterogeneous labor markets
Countries participating in a monetary union are intimately connected by a common monetary policy.
Therefore, structural reforms on the labor market directed by a national government can spill over onto a foreign country through the interest rate channel and the trade sector. In addition, the presence of heterogeneity among the labor markets may modify the welfare implications for each country of directing reforms. Our model is clearly not designed to discuss the labor markets' institutional con…guration neither the degree of regulation. We rather seek to investigate how labor market reforms in a particular country a¤ect the welfare of the countries into the monetary union. Precisely, the matching model described above allows us to analyze three transmission mechanisms through which labor market reforms can act: (i) a change in the separation process (s); (ii) a change in the matching technology (m); and (iii) a change in the household's bargaining power ( ). Therefore, we make a permanent increase in these key parameters at time 1 in order to reduce the home unemployment rate from 10:5% to 7:9% (the rate reached by the euro area in 2006) and we compute the welfare implication of such a modi…cation. There are many reasons for considering a reduction in matching frictions (through s andm). For instance, this could re ‡ect a stabilization of the economy, implying a reduction in the share of time-limited contracts relatively to the number of permanent contracts. This also could be due to an improvement of the services o¤ered by employment agencies.
In addition, the reduction in the household's bargaining strength could result from a smaller weight of the trade unions in the bargaining process. We then study the welfare implications of these labor market reforms for each member of the union under di¤erent speci…cations of heterogeneity (S0, S1
and S2).
Measuring welfare gains
As the model provides a fully micro-founded utility criterion, we build on a welfare analysis. In each country j 2 fH; Fg, we de…ne the welfare associated with the time-invariant stochastic allocation conditional on the initial steady state (init) of the economy in period 0 as 
Impacts of labor market reforms
We now clarify the incentives for unilateral structural reforms, leading changes in a structural parameter in the home country but leaving those in the foreign one unchanged. Assuming that the home labor market parameters (s;m; ) can be a¤ected through various structural policies, we seek to determine the direction in which a country has an incentive to direct its reforms, when the social planner aims at maximizing the social welfare. In particular, we assume that the government in the domestic country wants to reduce its steady-state unemployment rate from 10:5% to 7:9% whereas the foreign labor market is not reformed. Table 4 presents the welfare gains for each country of changing one of the three home labor market parameters (s;m; ). In each speci…cation, the home country (which directs the structural reform)
Impact of reforms under di¤erent speci…cations
corresponds to the one with a relatively high degree of frictions on its labor market. Therefore, the three speci…cations (S0, S1, S2) di¤er in the degree of frictions on the foreign labor market. 23 Speci…cation S0 We …rst discuss the impact of home labor market reforms when the two countries are symmetric and their labor markets are relatively rigid. In the …rst line of Table 4 , we assume that the job destruction rate (s) decreases at time 1 in order to reach a home unemployment rate of 7:9%. Since fewer jobs need to be rematched, home and foreign countries bene…t from a welfare improvement. In the …rst block-column (Table 4) , we show that the aggregate welfare increases by 3:22% in the domestic country and 1:49% in the foreign one. To gauge these welfare results more concretely, we note that European personal consumption expenditures were about 15300e per person in 2006; thus this would permanently increase welfare by about 493e per person and per period in the home country and 228e in the foreign country. Note: S0: The home and foreign labor markets are relatively rigid. S1: the home labor market is relatively rigid and the foreign one is more rigid. S2: the home labor market is relatively rigid and the foreign one is more ‡exible.
In the second line of speci…cation S0 (Table 4) , the decrease in the home unemployment rate from 10:5% to 7:9% results from an increase in the matching e¢ ciency (given bym). We obtain similar results than previously. Precisely, reducing the matching frictions by increasing the ‡ow out of employment is bene…cial for both countries in speci…cation S0. The welfare gain amounts to 3:21% in the home country and 1:48% in the foreign one. Therefore, the permanent increase in welfare would be of 491e per person in the home country and 226e per person in the foreign country. Our model suggests that the welfare gain is slightly larger when the new unemployment rate is reached by decreasing the job separation rate rather than by increasing the e¢ ciency of the labor match.
Finally, in the third line of speci…cation S0 (Table 4) , we reach a domestic unemployment rate of 7:9% by reducing the households' bargaining strength ( ). We then obtain that this reform is not advantageous to the home country since it su¤ers from welfare losses of about 1:33%. On the contrary, the foreign is not sensitive to this kind of reform since the welfare gains are equal to 0:03%.
Therefore, the permanent decrease in welfare would be of 203e per person in the home country and the welfare gains would reach 5e per person in the foreign one.
Speci…cation S1 The second block-column (Table 4) indicates the welfare gains of labor market reforms when the monetary union consists of a foreign labor market more rigid than the home one.
Concerning the welfare implications of moving s andm, we obtain similar qualitative results than in the previous speci…cation. Precisely, reducing the matching frictions in the home country (by making matching more e¤ective or by reducing the separation rate) implies higher welfare gains in the home country than in the foreign one. However, it appears that a reduction in the household's bargaining strength becomes costly in terms of welfare for both countries. Precisely, the permanent decrease in welfare would be of 203e per person in the home country and 56e per person in the foreign country.
Therefore, as it has been assumed in speci…cation S2, extending the foreign unemployment duration ( ) and reducing its unemployment bene…ts ( ) implies that the welfare implications of changing becomes negatives for the foreign country.
Speci…cation S2 The last block-column (Table 4) indicates the welfare gains of reforming the home labor market when the monetary union consists of a foreign labor market less frictional than the home one. It appears that the foreign country bene…ts more than the home country from the home labor market reforms. Precisely, following a reform directed in the home country, the less frictional the foreign labor market, the higher its welfare gains. The welfare gains are about 9%
in the foreign country when the matching frictions in the home country are reduced. In addition, reducing the household's bargaining power in the home country results in a reduction in the home welfare (as previously) and a welfare improvement in the foreign country.
Reforms on unemployment bene…ts
Labor market reforms could also act though a change in the home unemployment bene…ts (denoted by ). Indeed, we could assume that the national government seeks to decrease the unemployment rate through a reduction in the subsidies paid to the unemployed. Then, we consider a permanent decrease in parameter , so as to reach a new steady state unemployment rate of 9:1% in each con…guration. 24 The welfare gains implied by this kind of reform are given in the last line of Table 4 . We show that the results are similar to the one obtained when the household's bargaining power is reduced. Precisely, the reform is not welfare-enhancing for the home country whereas the foreign country bene…ts to this modi…cation if its labor market is ‡exible. This result is not surprising since the unemployment bene…ts a¤ect directly the real wage (like the household bargaining power). A decrease in generates a reduction in real wages as bene…ts determine the worker's threat point during the wage bargaining process. Therefore, the household bargaining power and the unemployment bene…ts parameters have the same welfare implications in this model.
Transition paths analysis
Therefore, we showed that the welfare implications in the foreign country change according to its degree of labor market frictions. Precisely, the less frictional the foreign labor market (in comparison with the home one), the higher the welfare gains of directing a structural reform in the home labor market. Now, we seek to understand the transmission mechanisms of changing home labor market parameters. Figure 1 This change in the home economy has spillover e¤ects in the foreign one. The simulated transition path of the terms of trade is less volatile than in the case of a change in s orm. Therefore, the foreign variables are less a¤ected by a change in the home household's bargaining power. On the contrary to the reforms on s andm, the new steady state of the foreign employment is slightly higher than the initial one (as for hours worked). In addition, the foreign households consume less in the new steady state, probably due to the real wage moderation and the decrease in the short-run of the terms of trade. Therefore, this implies a small (or negative) welfare gain in the foreign country.
Sensitivity analysis
In this sub-section, we investigate whether a modi…cation of the economic environment in the monetary union could modify the previous results.
Monetary policy rule
Although monetary policy is neutral in the long run, we can be interested in its role during the and (R3) denotes the benchmark rule including also the unemployment rate (with the same weight as output gap).
As shown in Table 5 , there are no signi…cant di¤erences among the monetary policy rules, meaning that the way the monetary authorities conduct their policy slightly in ‡uences the amount of the welfare gain. Nevertheless, we can observe that rule (R2) is the preferable one in each con…guration since it gives the highest welfare gains for the two countries. On the opposite, the worst speci…cation seems to be the pure in ‡ation targeting rule. Interestingly, we observe that introducing the unemployment rate in the rule does not ameliorate the welfare, except whenm is modi…ed. However, this is not surprising since a variation ofm is directly related to the unemployment dynamics through the matching function.
Country size and domestic bias
Our main results have been obtained by assuming that the two countries have the same size. However, in speci…cation S2, we calibrated the model so that the home country features a relatively rigid labor market (corresponding to France) and the foreign one features a ‡exible labor market (corresponding to the Netherlands). Therefore, we focus on this speci…cation S2 so as to investigate whether the consideration of the non-identical size between these two countries modify our conclusions. that reducing the size of the foreign country has strong e¤ects on its welfare gains. Indeed, when the home country aims at decreasing its unemployment rate from 10:5% to 7:9%, the foreign country is subject to welfare losses as soon as this rate is lower than the home one. This result means that ‡exibility of the labor market is not a su¢ cient condition for the foreign country to bene…t from the home structural reforms: having the same size is also required.
So as to complete our sensitivity analysis, we indicate the welfare gains of modifying s and with respect to the calibrated value of the home bias ! (Table 6 , panel b). As previously, we cannot compare the lines between them due to the modi…cation of the model's steady state. However, we show that our conclusions are robust to the calibrated value of this parameter. 
Nominal rigidities
The presence of nominal rigidities in our model implies some deviations of economic activity from its natural level which are potentially costly in terms of welfare. Here, we highlight the impact of these rigidities in our welfare analysis.
Price rigidities The Calvo-price staggering framework is characterized by a price dispersion among producers, meaning that prices are not re-adjusted to their e¢ cient level at each period.
Therefore, a lower degree of price rigidity should result in a welfare-enhancing in the two countries. It clearly appears that the evolution of the welfare gains with respect to the value of p is robust to the considered speci…cation. When the household's bargaining power are reduced, the more rigid the home prices, the smaller the home welfare gains. On the contrary, the foreign welfare gains are
higher. This result is inverted when the matching frictions are reduced. This means that removing price rigidities is not necessary welfare-enhancing, particularly when these nominal rigidities are combined with a modi…cation of the matching frictions. Precisely, we show that a high degree of price rigidity magni…es the welfare implications of reforming matching frictions in the home country.
This result highlights that several frictions (matching frictions, for instance) can o¤set the negative e¤ect of price rigidities in the economy. Wage inertia We introduced inertia in the wage dynamics through the backward-looking social norm assumption. However, we could not easily observe the wage adjustment rate ( w ). Therefore, we check whether the welfare gains change with the calibration of w . Figure 4 displays the welfare gains of changing a labor market instrument in the home country (s,m and ) so as to reduce the home unemployment rate to 7:9%, with respect to w . The solid lines correspond to a reduction in the job destruction rate s (left scale). The lines with diamonds correspond to an increase in the matching e¢ ciencym (left scale). Finally, the dashed lines correspond to a reduction in the household's bargaining power (right scale).
We show that the welfare gains are not very sensitive to the calibrated value of w , whatever the speci…cation (especially when s andm are changed). In addition, we show that the welfare gains slightly change with the value of w when the household's bargaining power is reduced. Indeed, the higher the degree of wage inertia, the smaller the welfare losses and the higher the welfare gains for the home and the foreign country, respectively. This result is not surprising since w is directly related to the wage determination equation, as well as the household's bargaining power. Consequently, the e¤ects of a reform on are slightly sensitive to the value of the degree of wage inertia.
Conclusion
The bad performance of the euro area labor market in ‡uences the well being of both the economy and society. The literature has attempted to incorporate labor market search and matching frictions in closed-economy representations of the area, however, in a single currency union, an additional di¢ culty due to the heterogeneity of the members appears. In this paper, we studied the role of labor markets heterogeneity in a monetary union and more particularly we investigated what are the welfare gains/costs of reforms on the labor market for each members of the area. We developed a medium-scale two-country model representing a currency union characterized by price and wage stickiness, real rigidities and labor market frictions.
Assuming that the model's labor market parameters can be a¤ected through various structural policies, we seek to determine the direction in which a country has an incentive to direct its reforms, when the social planner aims at maximizing the social welfare. Precisely, we focus on three parameters related to the labor market structure: the job destruction rate, the scaling parameter in the matching function, and the households'bargaining power. We assume a permanent shock on these structural parameters in order to achieve a lower home unemployment rate and we compute the social welfare gains/costs.
Several results emerge. First, the choice of the instruments to direct a reform (aiming at reducing the home unemployment rate) is not neutral on the amount of the social welfare gain in the union.
Indeed, the welfare gain is slightly higher by decreasing the job separation rate rather than by increasing the e¢ ciency of the labor match. On the contrary, a decrease in the households'bargaining power leads to mitigate and negligible e¤ects on the social welfare. Second, the e¤ects of a domestic reform on the "foreign welfare" depend on the characteristics of the foreign labor market. More particularly, the more ‡exible the foreign labor marhet, the higher the welfare gain. Third, the way the monetary authorities conduct their policy slightly in ‡uences the amount of the welfare gain, whatever the situation. Nevertheless, among di¤erent type of interest rate rules, using a rule including a strong reaction to in ‡ation allows to obtain the largest welfare improvement in both home and foreign country. Fourth, the size of a country in the monetary union plays an important role on the welfare e¤ects. For example, if a country with a ‡exible labor market has a small weight in the union, it can obtain a sizeable welfare loss following a domestic reform.
